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Duignan: Constitutional Law: Criminal Defendants' Standing to Object to Ra

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS'
STANDING TO OBJECT TO RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES***
Kibler v. State, 546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989)
Appellant, a white man, was charged with four counts of sexual
battery and burglary with battery.' At trial the prosecutor exercised
peremptory challenges against black venirepersons. 2 Appellant requested that the court inquire into the prosecutor's reasons for removing the prospective black jurors.3 After the prosecutor offered neutral
explanations, 4 appellant objected to their sufficiency. The trial court
failed to rule upon the appellant's objection 6 and the jury, as initially
picked, convicted appellant on all charges. 7 On appeal appellant contended that the removal of black venirepersons violated his right to
an impartial juryA Affirming the trial court, the Florida Fifth District
Court of Appeal held that appellant lacked standing to object to the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges because the appellant was not
black.9 The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower courts 0 and
*EditorsNote: This case comment received the George W. Milam OutstandingCase Comment
Award for Fall 1989.
**I would like to dedicate this comment to my parents, Jerry and Natalie Duignan, who have
always believed in me. I am truly grateful to Mitchel Krause without whom this comment would
not be possible. I also would like to thank Norman Powell for his constant support and thoughtful
comments and Patti Williams for all her patience and help.
1. Kibler v. State, 546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989).
2. Id. at 710. FLA. STAT. § 913.08 (1989) provides, "(1) The state and the defendant shall each
be allowed the following number of peremptory challenges:... (b) Six, if the offense charged
is punishable by imprisonment for more than 12 months but is not punishable by death or
imprisonment for life." Id.
3. Kibler, 546 So. 2d at 713.
4. See id. The prosecutor offered several nonracial reasons for excluding three black venirepersons. The prosecutor doubted one potential juror's intelligence. Another prospective juror
has served on a DUI jury three-and-one-half years earlier. Finally, the prosecutor did not object
to the third black venireperson he excused, stating that he merely preferred other jurors. Id.
5. Id. In support of the objection, appellant stated that the prosecutor must articulate
grounds for juror removal other than mere opinions as to the jurors' suitability. Id.
6. Id. at 714.
7. Id. at 710.
8. See id. The appellant did not expressly state the grounds for his claim.
9. Id. at 710-11. The court of appeal had implied that only members of the excluded group
suffered harm. See id.
10. Id. at 714. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial. Id.
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HELD, under article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution,11 defendants have standing, regardless of race, to object to peremptory challenges directed toward cognizable racial groups.2
Having its origins in the Magna Carta, the right to trial by jury
is a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 13 The Founding Fathers prized the right to a jury trial. 14 Their faith in the virtues
of that right culminated with the adoption of the sixth amendment to
the United States Constitution, which guarantees all criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury. 15
To ensure the right to an impartial jury, courts have developed
measures to prevent the impanelment of a biased jury. The peremptory
challenge, one such measure with historic credentials,16 dates back to
the emergence of jury trials in medieval England. 17 Fundamentally,
the purpose of the peremptory challenge is to eliminate from the jury
panel "extremes of bias," thereby leaving the most impartial tribunal
possible. 18 However, parties have manipulated the peremptory challenge, using it as a device for racial discrimination. 9
Courts have attempted to prevent improper, wholesale exclusion
of cognizable groups from the two stages of the jury selection process,

11. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon
demand,... have a speedy and public trial by [an] impartial jury .... ."). By basing its decision
on the Florida Constitution, the Florida Supreme Court provided broader rights than the Federal
Constitution may allow and also shielded its decision from United States Supreme Court
scrutiny. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
12. Kibler, 546 So. 2d at 712.
13. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898).
14. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? - Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images,
and Procedures, 64 N.C.L. REV. 501, 507 (1986). The Founding Fathers valued this right
primarily because they believed that layperson juries would prevent the arbitrary exercise of
government power. Id. at 508 n.43.
15. Id. at 508 n.45; see U.S. CONST. amend VI ("In all criminal prosecution, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury .... ").
16. See Johnson, The Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Blacks from Juries:An
Overview, 10 S.U.L. REV. 35, 35 (1983) (one of the first acts of the legislatures of every state
in the Union was to confer parties with the right to peremptory challenges).
17. Comment, Prosecutor's Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Racial Minorities
from Criminal Juries, 11 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 767, 768 (1984). As part of the American judicial
process, peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimensions. Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)). "Nonetheless,
the [peremptory] challenge Is one of the most important rights secured to the accused."' Id.
(quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
18. See Massaro, supra note 14, at 520.
19. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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the venire2P and the voir dire. 21 Discrimination may exist in the initial
process of selecting the pool of eligible jurors comprising the venire. 22
Even if discrimination does not exist in the venire selection procedure,
discrimination may exist in the voir dire, the procedure by which the
parties select the final jury. 2 At this stage of the jury selection process, the parties interview venirepersons to determine the most desirable jurors. 2 Each party then may eliminate potential jurors by challenging the jurors for cause or by making peremptory challenges,2
which do not require the party to articulate any reason for striking
the potential jurors from the panel.26 The voir dire continues until the
27
parties obtain the requisite number of jurors.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed discrimination
in the jury selection process by examining discrimination at the venire
level. In Peters v. Kiffp the Court addressed the issue of a defendant's
standing to object to discrimination in the selection of the venire. 29
In Kiff an all-white jury convicted the defendant, a white man, of
burglary. 3 On appeal, the defendant contended that the jury that
convicted him resulted from a selection process that systematically
excluded blacks, in violation of his rights under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment31
In reversing the defendant's conviction, 32 the Kiff Court recognized
the defendant's standing to challenge the exclusion of a cognizable

20, See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1974).
21. See, e.g., State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2873 (1988);
Floyd v. State, 511 So. 2d 762 (3d D.C.A. 1987), review denied, 545 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1989);
see also Comment, Is There a Placefor the Challenge of Racially-BasedPeremptoryChallenges?,
1984 DET. C.L. REV. 703 (1984).
22. See infra notes 28 & 38 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 52 & 61 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 913.03, .08, .10 (1987).
25. See id.
26. While peremptory challenges ordinarily do not require justification, a suspicion of racially
motivated peremptory challenges may require explanation. See State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18,
2.3 (Fla.) (state's pattern exclusion of a minority requires state to support its explanations with
neutral reasons from answers in the voir dire), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2873 (1988).
27. See FLA. STAT. §§ 913.03, .08, .10 (1987).
28. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
29. Id. at 496.
30. Id. at 494. The procedural history was "long and complicated." Id. at 494 n.1. The
appeal was from the court of appeals' affirmance of a denial of a petition for habeas corpus. Id.
31. Id. at 494. Although the defendant's claim was based upon both the equal protection
and due process clauses, the Court relied only on the due process clause. Id. at 504.
32. Id. The appellate court had affirmed the conviction, stating that because the defendant
was not black, he had suffered no harm. Peters v. Kiff, 441 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd,
407 U.S. 493 (1972).
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group from the venire.3 The Court held that the defendant's race did

not affect this right.3 According to the Court, the exclusion of a
cognizable group eliminates a perspective from the jury that may be
crucial to rendering a fair verdict for the defendant.3 Consequently,
the exclusion of blacks from a venire, even from a white defendant's
venire, could constitute reversible error 6 The Court maintained that
exclusions have a potential impact too subtle and pervasive
to condition
37
a defendant's right to object upon the defendant's race.
Three years later in Taylor v. Louisiana,s the United States
Supreme Court evaluated the same standing issue in the context of
gender discrimination.3 9 In Taylor, an all-male jury convicted a male
defendant of aggravated kidnapping. 40 The defendant appealed the
conviction, claiming that the systematic exclusion of women from the
venire 41 deprived him of his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights
to an impartial jury.The Taylor Court reversed the defendant's conviction.4 3 The Court
held that a male defendant has standing to challenge the exclusion of
women from his venire.- In recognizing the defendant's standing, the

33. Kiff,407 U.S. at 503-04.
34. Id. at 504 ("We hold that, whatever his race, a criminal defendant has standing to challenge
the system used to select his grand or petit jury, on the ground that it arbitrarily excludes
from service the members of any race . . . .") (emphasis added).
35. Id. For similar reasoning in the context of gender, see infranotes 46-48 and accompanying text.
36. Kiff, 407 U.S. at 503.
37. Id.
38. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
39. Id. at 526. While the Kiff standing issue related to race, the Taylor Court addressed
the same issue in the gender context. Id.
40. Id. at 524.
41. Id. The Louisiana Constitution stated, "No woman shall be drawn for jury service
unless she shall have previously friled with the clerk of the District Court a written declaration
of her desire to be subject to such service." Id. n.1 (quoting LA. CONST. of 1921, art. VII, §
41. The Louisiana Constitution now provides, "A citizen of the State who has reached the age
of majority is eligible to serve as a juror within the parish in which he is domiciled. The
legislature may provide additional qualifications." LA. CONST. art. V, § 32.
42. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 525.
43. Id. The defendant had sought review in the Louisiana Supreme Court. That court
upheld the validity of the state constitutional provisions at issue and further held that they
were not unconstitutional under federal law. State v. Taylor, 282 So. 2d 491, 497 (La. 1973).
44. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526. The Court did not state its reasons for recognizing the defendant's standing to challenge discrimination in the venire selection procedure. Implicitly, the
Court saw no reason why the Kiff rationale would not apply in the context of gender. See id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss5/4

4

Duignan: Constitutional
Law: Criminal Defendants' Standing to Object to Ra
CASE COMMENTS

Court announced the "fair cross section" requirement. 45 This standard
requires that the venire provide a "fair possibility for obtaining a
representative cross-section of the community. '' 46 The Court stressed
that factors influence men and women differently and that the subtle
interplay of these differences mandates a fair cross section requirement
in the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. 47 The Court concluded that only a heterogeneous jury can assure "diffuse impartiality. "48

The Taylor and Kiff decisions ensure a defendant standing to object
to discrimination in the venire selection procedure. 49 Following these
decisions, courts have extended a defendant's standing to object to
discrimination in the other stage of the jury selection process, the
voir dire.5° In State v. Nei615 the Florida Supreme Court addressed
the issue of a defendant's standing to object to the exclusion of blacks
during the voir dire. 2 In Neil the defendant, a black man, was charged
with second degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm At
the trial the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove
black venirepersons.M The trial judge overruled the defendant's objections to the peremptory challenges, and the jury convicted the defendant on both charges.
56
On appeal the Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
relying on article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution, the state

45. Id. at 530. The Court stated two reasons why it embraced the fair cross section requirement: to compensate for the potential prejudice of the prosecutor or judge and to engender
community participation in the judicial process, which is critical to the system's integrity. Id.
46. Id. at 528. The Court emphasized that it was imposing no requirement that petit juries
actually chosen must mirror the various distinctive groups in the community. Id. Defendants
are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition. Rather, the venire selection procedure
must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community, thereby making the venire
fail to fairly represent the community. Id.
47. Id. at 531-32.
48. Id. at 530 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
49. Id. at 526; Kiff, 407 U.S. at 504.
50. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2873 (1988); Floyd v.
State, 511 So. 2d 762 (3d D.C.A. 1987), review denied, 545 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1989).
51. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
52. Id. at 486.
53. Id. at 482.
54. Id. For Neil's trial, the jury pool consisted of 35 prospective jurors, four of whom were
black. The state exercised peremptory challenges to remove the first three blacks called. Id.
55. Id. at 483.
56. Id. at 482. The district court had affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant
had not met the requirements of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), which required proof
of a "State's purposeful or deliberate denial [of jury participation] to Negroes on account of

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

5

Florida
Law Review,
Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 4
FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

constitutional counterpart to the sixth amendment of the Federal Constitution. 57 In reaching its decision, the Neil court outlined new procedures for objecting to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. The court did not require defendants raising the objection to
be members of the excluded group. 59 By not limiting standing in this
manner, the court implicitly recognized the standing of all defendants,
regardless of race, to object to the discriminatory use of peremptory
6
challenges . 0
Shortly thereafter, in Batson v. Kentucky, 61 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the same standing issue that the Florida
Supreme Court had faced in Neil. In Batson a black defendant was
indicted for second degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 62 During the voir dire, the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to
remove black venirepersons. 3 The defendant moved to dismiss the
jury, arguing that the exclusion of potential black jurors violated his
6
rights under the sixth amendment and the equal protection clause.

race." Id. at 203-04. Recognizing that this issue was troublesome, however, the district court
certified the question to the Supreme Court. See Neil, 457 So. 2d at 483.
57. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 486. For the text of FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16, see supranote 11.
58. See Neil, 457 So. 2d at 486-87. The court articulated the following procedure:
The initial presumption is that peremptories will be exercised in a nondiscriminatory
manner. A party concerned about the other side's use of peremptory challenges
must ... demonstrate.., that the challenged persons are members of a distinct
racial group and that there is a strong likelihood that they have been challenged
solely because of their race. If a party accomplishes this, then the trial court must
decide if there is a substantial likelihood that the peremptory challenges are being
exercised solely on the basis of race. If the court finds no such likelihood, no inquiry
may be made of the person exercising the questioned peremptories. On the other
hand, if the court decides that such a likelihood ...
exist[s], the burden shifts to
the [other party] to show that the questioned challenges were not exercised solely
because of the prospective juror's race. The reasons given in response to the court's
inquiry need not be equivalent to those for a challenge for cause. If the party
shows that the challenges were based [upon other reasons not related to race],
then the inquiry should end and jury selection should continue. On the other hand,
if the party has actually been challenging [prospective jurors solely] on the basis
of race, then the court should dismiss that jury pool and start voir dire over with
a new pool.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
59. See id. at 486.
60. See id.
61. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
62. Id. at 82.
63. Id. at 83.
64. Id. At this time, the federal circuits disagreed over the circumstances under which a
trial judge's supervisory power could be used to scrutinize the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to strike blacks from the venire. Compare United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541,
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The trial court denied the motion and stated that the fair cross section
requirement of the sixth amendment applied only to the venire selection procedure, not the voir dire. The jury then convicted the defendant on both charges.6
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction,67 holding that the equal protection clause s forbids the prosecution from
striking venirepersons solely on the basis of race. 69 However, the
Court stated that to challenge such an exclusion solely on evidence
derived from the prosecution's actions in the defendant's own trial, 70
a defendant must establish certain factors to raise the inference of
discrimination.71 Initially, the defendant must show that he or she is
a member of a cognizable racial group72 and that the prosecutor struck
potential jurors who were also members of that group. 3 Once the
defendant has established this necessary relationship to the excluded
venirepersons, he or she must prove facts and circumstances sufficient
to raise an inference that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges with discriminatory intent- The Court maintained that a prose-

541 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (without a claim or prima facie showing of discrimination, courts
have no authority to inquire into a party's reasons for exercising peremptory challenges against
a particular group), vacated, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987) with United States v. Jackson, 696 F.2d 578,
592-93 (8th Cir. 1982) (allowing the trial court to exercise its supervisory powers to minimize
the potential for the government's racially motivated misuse of peremptory challenges), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1073 (1983).
65. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 84. On appeal the Kentucky Supreme Court had affirmed the trial court's decision.
That court reaffirmed its reliance on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), see supra note
56, and held that a defendant alleging lack of a fair cross section must demonstrate systematic
exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire. Id.
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
69. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. This restriction is necessary to secure the defendant's fourteenth
amendment right to "protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice." Id. at 86-87
(quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880)).
70. The Court also articulated other ways a defendant could challenge peremptory challenges
based upon evidence in a trial other than the defendant's: "For example, an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised on evidence that a prosecutor, 'in case after case, whatever
the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes .
' Id. at 91-92 (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. 202).
71. Id. at 96.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The Court stated that the defendant may rely on the presumption that peremptory
challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a
mind to discriminate." Id. at 80 (quoting Aveny v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). Furthermore, the defendant must show any other relevant circumstances that raise an inference of
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cutor's repeated use of peremptory challenges to dismiss black venirepersons could support an inference that the strikes were racially motivated. 7 Because the trial court had excluded black venirepersons without requiring the prosecutor to explain his reasons, the Batson Court
remanded the case for consideration of whether purposeful discrimination existed. 76
The instant court held that a defendant has standing to challenge
discrimination during the voir dire, even when the defendant is not
a member of the excluded racial group.- In interpreting the reasoning
of Taylor and Kiff,78 the instant court could find no rational difference
between discrimination in the venire selection procedure and discriminatory use of peremptory challenges during the voir dire. 79 Accordingly, the fair cross section requirement should apply to both stages
of the jury selection process 0 The instant court concluded that the
exclusion of prospective jurors based upon race is improper at any
stage of the jury selection process because it violates the defendant's
right to an impartial jury.8 1
The instant court also noted that the Neil court relied on article
I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution in prohibiting the exercise
of peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race. 2 Although Neil
involved a black defendant challenging the exclusion of black jurors,
the instant court stressed that the Neil court had imposed no conditions
upon a defendant's right to object. Thus, the instant court concluded
that under article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution4 a defendant who objects to peremptory challenges directed to a cognizable
racial group need not be a member of that group to have standing.

discrimination. For illustrative purposes, the Court stated that a pattern of strikes against black
venirepersons or discriminatory questions and statements during the voir dire might qualify as
such relevant circumstances. However, the Court ultimately concluded that the trial judge
retained discretion. Id. at 97.
75.

Id.

76. Id. at 100.
77. Kibler, 546 So. 2d at 712.
78. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526; Kiff, 407 U.S. at 504. To ensure the fair cross section
requirement, Kiff and Taylor held that a defendant, although not a member of the excluded
class, had standing to challenge a biased venire. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526; Kiff, 407 U.S. at 504.
79. See Kibler, 546 So. 2d at 712.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 711.
83. Id.
84. For the text of FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16, see supra note 11.
85. Kibler, 546 So. 2d at 712. Despite its expansive reading of Neil, the instant court stated
that a defendant's race was not completely irrelevant in determining whether peremptory chal-
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To further support its holding, the instant court distinguished Batson, which required that a defendant must be a member of the excluded
group to have standing to object to racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges. 6 The instant court assumed that Batson's restriction on
standing to defendants that are members of the excluded group arose
from the particular facts of that case.7 The instant court hypothesized
that if Batson had involved a white defendant, then the Supreme Court

would not have applied an equal protection analysis, thus obviating
the need to limit standing to defendants who are members of the
excluded race. s
By not requiring a defendant to belong to the excluded race to
have standing to object to discriminatory peremptory challenges during the voir dire, the instant court implicitly imposed a requirement
in Florida that a fair possibility exist that the petit jury, not just the
venire, represent a fair cross section of the community. In evaluating
whether a criminal defendant has standing to object to discrimination
in the jury selection process, the United State Supreme Court has
not yet applied the sixth amendment's fair cross section requirement
to the exercise of peremptory challengesY9 However, applying the fair
cross section requirement to the voir dire is logical since Kiff and
Taylor demand that courts apply it at the venire stage.9 If the state's

lenges were discriminatory. Id. It noted that, under the procedure prescribed in Neil,
the objecting party must do more than just identify the state's removal of a cognizable group
from the jury. Rather, the objecting party must also raise the presumption that the exclusion
of a cognizable group was racially motivated. The instant court concluded that a defendant who
is of a different race than the excluded group may have more difficulty meeting this additional
burden because the court will not presume harm. Therefore, although a defendant's race may
be relevant in determining whether he has met his initial burden, the instant court held that
a defendant's race was unrelated to his standing to raise the issue. Id.
86. Id. at 711 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 94).
87. Id. The instant court stated that it was not convinced that, had the issue faced the
United States Supreme Court, the Court would have precluded a white defendant from objecting
to the removal of blacks during voir dire. Id.
88. See id.
89. See Magid, Challenges to Jury Composition: Purging the Sixth Amendment Analysis
of Equal ProtectionConcepts, 24 SAN DIEoO L. REv. 1081, 1082 (1987); supra notes 29 & 39
and accompanying text. This issue is currently before the United States Supreme Court. This
term the Court heard arguments in Holland v. Illinois, 147 Ill. App. 3d 323, 497 N.E.2d 1230
(1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989). In Holland the Court will decide whether the use
of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from a jury trying a white man violates the fair
cross section requirement of the sixth amendment. See Reske, Supreme Court Preview, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 1989, at 54. The Court's decision either will weaken or will add further support to the
instant court's decision. However, because the instant court's decision is based upon state
grounds, only a minimal threat eists that the instant case would be subject to reversal. Id.
90. See Magid, supra note 89, at 1082.
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exercise of peremptory challenges denies seats on the final petit jury
to particular groups, including such groups in the venire is of no
consequence. 91 Therefore, failure to recognize a defendant's standing
to challenge discrimination during the voir dire frustrates the policies
enunciated in Kiff and Taylor.92
Moreover, even if the United States Supreme Court refuses to
extend the fair cross section requirement of the sixth amendment to the
exercise of peremptory challenges, the instant court's decision will
remain unaffected. The instant court based its decision on the state
constitution, not the Federal Constitution. 3 The United States Supreme
Court usually does not consider appeals based upon an independent
interpretation of a state constitution.9 Furthermore, states are free
to provide defendants with protections greater than those guaranteed
under the Federal Constitution. 95 If state law grants a defendant more
protection than does the Federal Constitution, then state law controls.96 Thus, the instant court's reliance on the Florida Constitution
immunizes the instant court's decision from the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution on this issue.
Most importantly, the instant court's sixth amendment analysis
provides Florida defendants the highest possibility of a trial by an
impartial jury. The instant court's reliance on the state constitutional
counterpart to the sixth amendment deviated from federal cases like
Batson and Kiff which were based upon equal protection and due
process analyses, respectively. 97 Sixth amendment analysis is the
superior framework for determining whether discrimination exists in
the jury selection process because it ensures broader applicability and
circumvents the analytical infirmities of both due process and equal
protection analyses.98
One commentator has noted the flaws inherent in due process
analysis. 99 Due process analysis will not prevent racially discriminatory
exclusions unless a court concludes that white jurors cannot decide
91. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 271-72, 583 P.2d 748, 758-59, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 899-900 (1978).
92. See Comment, supra note 21, at 712.
93. See Kibler, 546 So. 2d at 712.
94. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1983).
95. See id. at 1038.
96. Id. at 1033.
97. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 (decision based upon the equal protection clause although
the defendant raised both sixth amendment fair cross section requirement and fourteenth amendment equal protection clause claims); Kiff, 407 U.S. at 504 (Court based its decision on the due
process clause although defendant also had raised equal protection claim).
98. Massaro, supra note 14, at 536-37.
99. Id.
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fairly cases that involve nonwhite defendants. °0 Courts usually are unwilling to reach such a conclusion because doing so would cast doubts
on the judicial system's ability to be impartial.101 Moreover, a court
cannot acknowledge that a person's color determines the ability to understand and judge fairly another individual without compromising the

court's own integrity. 102

In addition to avoiding the problems underlying due process
analysis, sixth amendment analysis also provides a means of effectively
skirting the constraints of Batson's equal protection analysis. Certain
groups that are not "discrete and insular,"' 3 and therefore not entitled
to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause, °4 are cognizable
for sixth amendment purposes. 0 5 Although the fair cross section requirement and equal protection clause have similar goals, the latter
possesses aspects that narrow its utility. °6 While the equal protection
clause is directed primarily toward eliminating group discrimination,
sixth amendment analysis protects every criminal defendant's right to
a fair and impartial jury. 107 Consequently, sixth amendment analysis
extends the safeguards of the equal protection clause to a broader
class of defendants.
By applying Florida's counterpart to the sixth amendment, the
instant court independently evaluated how race affects a defendant's
standing to object to discrimination. In stating that race is irrelevant
in determining a defendant's right to object,' °s the instant court assumed that whenever the state excludes any racial group it removes
from the jury qualities of human nature and experience unique to that
group. °9 Thus, the verdict is less likely to reflect the community's

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 537.
103. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (stricter review
under equal protection analysis applies to laws "directed at particular... racial minorities"
because "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon

to protect minorities.') (citations omitted).
104. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 472 U.S. 1024 (1985) (denying strict
scrutiny to retarded people); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (classification based upon illegal
alien status does not warrant strict scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (women as
a group not entitled to strict scrutiny).
105. See Magid, supra note 89, at 1090-91.
106. Id. at 1112-13.
107. Id.
108. See Kibler, 546 So. 2d at 712.
109. See Kiff, 407 U.S. at 503.
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judgment. 110 The defendant is harmed, regardless of his or her race.
Therefore, by relying on the sixth amendment counterpart in the
Florida Constitution, the instant court was able to grant standing to
a broader class of Florida defendants than the Federal Constitution
has allowed.
The instant court augmented the earlier decisions concerning discrimination in the selection of the venire by granting defendants, regardless of their race, standing to challenge discrimination during the
voir dire."' The instant decision affords broader protection against
discrimination than either Taylor or Kiff, cases dealing only with
discrimination in the venire selection procedure."1 Essentially, extending a defendant's right to object to discrimination beyond the venire
selection procedure to the voir dire gives Florida defendants the opportunity to challenge potential discrimination at all stages of the jury
selection process, thus increasing the probability of securing a fair
and impartial jury.
Racial discrimination is especially invidious when it exists in the
judicial system.13 By tolerating discrimination in the jury selection
process, courts undermine the goals of eliminating racial prejudice and
providing fair and representative juries. Presently, the methods for
discovering discrimination in the jury selection process are uncertain. 114
The instant court's decision is an affirmative step toward eradicating
discrimination in the judicial process and securing the integrity of our
criminal justice system.t
Christine M. Duignan

110. Comment, Skin Color Doesn't Reason: Closing the Door on the DiscriminatoryUse
of Peremptory Challenges, 64 U. DET. L. REv. 171, 191 (1986).
111. See Kibler, 546 So. 2d at 712.
112. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 525-26; Kiff, 407 U.S. at 504.
113. See Anderson, Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, FLA. B.J., July-Aug.,
1989, 15, 18. Although the instant court limited its holding to the context of racial discrimination,

courts should not tolerate discrimination against any cognizable group.
114. Johnson, supra note 16, at 47.
tAuthors Note: On January 22, 1989, the United States Supreme Court decided Holland v.
Illinois, 58 U.S.L.W. 4162 (1989). The Court held in a five-to-four decision that a white defendant
had standing to raise a sixth amendment challenge to a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges to exclude all black potential jurors from the defendant's petit jury. Id. at 4163.
However, the Court's treatment of the second issue emasculated this holding. Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia stated that, although the defendant had standing to object, the exclusion

of black potential jurors from his petit jury did not violate the defendant's sixth amendment
right to a trial by an impartial jury. Id. at 4164. Thus, the Court granted standing, but found
the claim without merit.
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On the issue of standing, Justice Scalia stated that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
see supra text accompanying notes 61-76, required that a defendant be a member of the excluded
race as a necessary element in establishing an equal protection violation. Holland, 58 U.S.L.W.
at 4163 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96). He further argued that the requirement of such a
correlation between race was not necessary for sixth amendment standing. Id. at 4163. Similar
to the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning in the instant case, see supra text accompanying note
77, Justice Scalia wrote: "[The Sixth Amendment entitles every defendant to object to a venire
that is not designed to represent a fair cross section of the community, whether or not the
systematically excluded groups are groups to which he himself belongs." Holland, 58 U.S.L.W.
at 4163.
The Court's analysis of the sixth amendment issue is of greater significance. The Court set
forth a number of reasons to hold that a white defendant "does not have a valid constitutional
challenge based on the Sixth Amendment" to object to peremptory challenges. Id. at 4166 (emphasis in original). The Court explained that such a right had no basis in the text of the sixth
amendment, was not supported by precedent, and would undermine the constitutional guarantees
of an impartial jury. Id. at 4164.
Holland suggests that the Florida Supreme Court incorrectly read Batson in the instant
case. While the Florida Supreme Court appears to be in consonance with the United States
Supreme Court's view that "no rational distinction can be drawn" between "fair cross-section
jurisprudence" as applied to the venire selection procedure and the voir dire, id. at 4169 (Marshall, J., dissenting), the Florida court's reasoning in the instant case, see supratext accompanying notes 78-80, is in direct contravention with the Hollandmajority's position that "Batson...
held that race-based exclusion is no more permissible at the individual petit jury stage than at
the venire stage - not because the two stages areinseparablylinked but because the intransigent
prohibition of racial discrimination contained in the FourteenthAmendment applies to both of
them." Holland, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4164 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). Thus, the Holland
Court, in refusing to extend the fair cross section requirement to the voir dire, drew a distinction
between applying the sixth amendment requirement at the venire selection procedure and
applying the requirement at the voir dire. The instant court did not draw this distinction. See
supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
Despite the United States Supreme Court's refusal to apply the sixth amendment fair cross
section requirement to the voir dire, the instant court's holding is preserved. The Florida
Supreme Court exercised acute prescience when it based its decision on independent state
constitutional provisions. Under the doctrine of Mfichigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), see
supra text accompanying notes 94-96, the instant court's holding remains unaffected by the
decision in Holland.
The instant court's use of the Long doctrine assures that Florida defendants have the highest
possibility of an impartial jury regardless of the United States Supreme Court's interpretations
of the sixth amendment of the Federal Constitution. Florida has recognized that only affirmative
steps at every stage of the jury selection process will remove the pall that discrimination casts
upon our criminal justice system.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 4

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss5/4

14

